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Abstract
We consider zero-sum repeated games in which the players are restricted to strategies that
require only a limited amount of randomness. Let vn be the max-min value of the n stage
game; previous works have characterized limn→∞ vn, i.e., the long-run max-min value.
Our first contribution is to study the convergence rate of vn to its limit. To this end, we
provide a new tool for simulation of a source (target source) from another source (coin
source). Considering the total variation distance as the measure of precision, this tool
offers an upper bound for the precision of simulation, which is vanishing exponentially
in the difference of Re´nyi entropies of the coin and target sources. In the second part of
paper, we characterize the set of all approximate Nash equilibria achieved in long run. It
turns out that this set is in close relation with the long-run max-min value.
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1. Introduction
Nash (1950) showed that all one-shot games have at least one equilibrium in the
mixed strategies. Private randomness is required to implement mixed strategies, and
consequently a Nash equilibrium may not exist if insufficient random bits are available to
the players (See Huba´cˇek et al. (2016) and Budinich and Fortnow (2011)).
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Limited randomness in repeated zero-sum games was originally studied by Neyman and Okada
(2000) and Gossner and Vieille (2002). Gossner and Vieille (2002) studied a repeated
zero-sum game between Alice (the maximizer) and Bob (the minimizer). At the begin-
ning of each stage of the game, Alice observed an independent drawing of a random
source X with a commonly known distribution. Next, the players played an action which
was monitored by the other player. The only source of randomization available to Alice
was the outcomes of random source X . Thus, Alice had to choose the action of each
stage as a deterministic function of the history of her observations, i.e., the random
sources revealed up to that stage and the previous actions. However, Bob could freely
randomize his actions, and hence, at each stage, he chose his action as a random function
of the actions played previously. Generalizing the model of Gossner and Vieille (2002),
Valizadeh and Gohari (2017) considered the possibility of leakage of Alice’s random source
sequence to Bob; thus, they called it the repeated game with leaked randomness source. In
other words, Bob monitored the random source of Alice through a noisy channel. Specif-
ically, let (X1, Y1), (X2, Y2), . . . be a sequence of independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) random variables distributed according to a given distribution pXY . At arbitrary
stage t, before choosing the actions for that stage, Alice observed Xt, and Bob observed
Yt. In this model, Alice and Bob could randomize their actions at each stage just by
conditioning their actions to the history of their observations up to that stage.
In this paper, we study two different aspects of the repeated game with leaked ran-
domness sources. Our first contribution is to study the max-min payoff that Alice can
secure in a repeated game with finite number of stages. Note that Valizadeh and Gohari
(2017) characterized the long run max-min value, i.e., the maximum payoff that Alice
can secure regardless of what strategy Bob chooses when the number of stages tends to
infinity. More precisely, let vn be the max-min value of the n-stage repeated game with
leaked randomness source. Valizadeh and Gohari (2017) characterized limn→∞ vn. In this
paper, we investigate how vn converges to its limit. To do so, we develop and utilize a
new tool for simulation of a source from another source, which we will introduce later in
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Section 1.1.
Our second contribution is to study the set of equilibria that is implementable by
Alice and Bob in the repeated game with leaked randomness sources. As stated above,
implementable Nash equilibria do not necessarily exist. However, a relaxed version of
Nash equilibria called approximate Nash equilibria may exist. Let ǫA and ǫB be arbitrary
positive numbers. We say a given strategy profile forms a (ǫA, ǫB)-Nash equilibrium if
Alice and Bob do not gain more than ǫA and ǫB, respectively, by unilaterally changing
their corresponding strategies. We characterize the set of (ǫA, ǫB)-Nash equilibria of the
repeated game when the number of stages of the game tends to infinity. This set is
characterized in terms of the maximum payoffs that Alice and Bob can secure in long run
(long run max-min and min-max values).
Note that in previous works (Neyman and Okada (2000); Gossner and Vieille (2002);
Valizadeh and Gohari (2017)), the max-min (or min-max) value of the zero-sum repeated
game was achieved by autonomous strategies – a strategy that is indifferent about the
actions of the opponent in past stages. Therefore, we address the question as to whether
autonomous strategies are sufficient for achieving all implementable approximate Nash
equilibria. To do this, we also characterize the set of all approximate Nash equilibria
achieved by autonomous strategies in long run. It will turn out that the set of approx-
imate equilibria achieved by autonomous strategies is absolutely smaller than the set of
approximate equilibria achieved by arbitrary strategies.
1.1. A new tool
A key step in the proofs of Gossner and Vieille (2002) and Valizadeh and Gohari
(2017) is to divide the total n stages of the repeated game into some blocks such that the
actions of the first player in each block (excluding the first block) is generated as a func-
tion of the randomness source observed during the previous block.1 In other words, the
1This strategy is known as the block Markov strategy in information theory and utilized in multi-hop
communication settings.
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actions of the first player in each block is simulated from the randomness source observed
in the previous block. Since we are interested in the non-asymptotic regime where the
number of stages n is given and fixed, we need to carefully optimize over the length of the
blocks and also prove a fine estimate on the accuracy of simulation of the actions of each
block from the observations of the previous block. Thus, in order to study the repeated
game with n stages, we provide a new tool for simulation of a source from another source
which is of independent interest.
More precisely, in abstract terms, let X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y be arbitrary discrete random
variables distributed according to some probability mass function pXY , and let A ∈ A be
a target random variable distributed according to pA. We would like to simulate A from
X (by using a deterministic function f : X → A) in such a way that the resulting random
variable, f(X), is almost independent of Y , and its distribution is close to pA. Intuitively,
if the amount of uncertainty of X given Y is much more than the amount of uncertainty
of A, then, one might find a simulator f : X → A satisfying the above conditions. We
take the Re´nyi entropy as our measure of uncertainty, and the total variation distance as
our measure of similarity. We prove that there exists a mapping f : X → A such that for
arbitrary 1 ≤ α ≤ 2,
‖pf(X)Y − pApY ‖TV ≤ 2
−(1− 1
α
)
(
Hα(X|Y )−H 1
α
(A)+2
)
, (1)
where ‖.‖TV denotes the total variation distance, Hα(X|Y ) denotes the conditional Re´nyi
entropy (with parameter α) of X given Y , and H 1
α
(A) is the Re´nyi entropy of A with
parameter 1/α. The main idea to prove Equation (1) is to relate it to norms of linear
maps and then utilize the Riesz-Thorin Interpolation Theorem.
To better understand Equation (1), let us apply it to a sequence of random variables.
Assume that (X1, Y1), (X2, Y2), . . . , (Xn, Yn) are n i.i.d. repetitions according to pXY . Our
goal is to simulate (A1, A2, . . . , An), which is an i.i.d. sequence according to pA. Applying
Equation (1) to X˜ = (X1, . . . , Xn), Y˜ = (Y1, . . . , Yn), and A˜ = (A1, . . . , An), we obtain
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that there exists a mapping f : X n → An such that for arbitrary 1 ≤ α ≤ 2,
‖pf(Xn)Y n − pAnpY n‖TV ≤ 2
−(1− 1
α
)
(
nHα(X|Y )−nH 1
α
(A)+2
)
≤ 2−n(1−
1
α
)
(
Hα(X|Y )−H 1
α
(A)
)
, (2)
where we used the fact that Hα(X
n|Y n) = nHα(X|Y ) and H 1
α
(An) = nH 1
α
(A). Equa-
tion (2) shows that the accuracy of simulation is improving exponentially fast in the
product of three terms: the block length n, the term 1− 1/α, and the entropy difference
Hα(X|Y )−H 1
α
(A).
Moreover, Equation (1) can be interpreted in a different way: we say that R(·) is a
measure of randomness if for any discrete random variable X , R(X) is a non-negative
real number. The value R(X) quantifies the amount of uncertainty in X . Then, R(·) is a
reasonable measure of randomness only if it is non-increasing under mappings. In other
words, if random variable A is a deterministic function of random variable X , we expect
R(X) ≥ R(A). The question then arises whether the converse to this statement can also
be true:
Question: Is there a suitable measure of randomness R(·) such that R(X) ≥ R(A) if and
only if there is a function f : X 7→ A such that f(X) is distributed according to pA?
While the answer to this question is negative, our tool shows that an approximate version
of it holds. To see why the answer to this question is negative, let X ∈ {0, 1} be a
binary random variable. Then, f(X) has the same amount of randomness as X if f is a
one-to-one function (f(0) 6= f(1)), and f(X) is deterministic if f(0) = f(1). Therefore,
R(f(X)) ∈ {0,R(X)} and cannot take values lying between 0 and R(X). However, if
we require f(X) to have a distribution that is “approximately” equal to pA, the above
question can be revisited. In fact, our tool shows that Re´nyi entropy is an answer for the
approximate version of the above question.
Relation of Equation (1) to previous works: The problem of simulation of a source
from another source dates back to the work of Von Neumann (1951), who considered the
problem of generating a sequence of i.i.d. fair bits from a given sequence of i.i.d. unfair
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bits. The algorithm presented by Von Neumann (1951) is universal in the sense that
it does not need the knowledge of the distribution of the input bits, and it is exact in
the sense that the output bits are exactly fair. Von Neumann (1951) also offered a non-
universal exact algorithm for simulation of a desired continuous distribution from a given
continuous random variable with known distribution. A generalization of the algorithm
of Von Neumann (1951) for arbitrary Markov inputs can be found in Elias (1972) and
Bernardini and Rinaldo (2018). There are other works that have considered non-exact
simulation of a source. Considering the total variation distance as the measure of accu-
racy, Yassaee et al. (2014) studied non-universal generation of independent fair bits from
an i.i.d. sequence of random variables with side information, and Han (2003) considered
the simulation of a general sequence from a general input sequence with known distri-
bution. Fundamental limits for generation of arbitrary random sequence from a general
sequence of random variables under different measures of accuracy has been studied by
Vembu and Verdu´ (1995) and Yu and Tan (2019).
Above works considered the simulation of an intended long sequence from a long in-
put sequence. In contrast, a different approach for generating random bits (randomness
extraction) is to provide results for arbitrary single-letter sources, and then, conclude
results for sequences; works of Renner (2008), Hayashi (2011) and Mojahedian et al.
(2018) on randomness extraction and privacy amplification lie in this category. The
tool we present in this paper generalizes the results of Renner (2008), Hayashi (2011)
and Mojahedian et al. (2018); in fact, they considered the special case of simulation of
random variable A having a uniform distribution over a set A (when A is uniform, sim-
ulating A can be interpreted as extracting log |A| bits of randomness). Furthermore, in
this paper, we adopt the total variation distance as the measure of accuracy which has a
close relation with the expected payoff in games. We also use concentration inequalities
to provide further refinements (Proposition 15).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the notations
of this paper and present a brief discussion of Shannon and Re´nyi entropy. The repeated
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game with leaked randomness source is defined in Section 3, where we also provide our
results on the convergence rate of the max-min payoff of games with finite number of
stages. In Section 3.2, we introduce our tool for simulation of a source from another
source. In Section 4, we characterize the set of approximate Nash equilibria achievable in
long run. Some of the proofs are presented in Appendices.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notations
In this paper, we use the notation xj to represent a sequence of variables (x1, x2, . . . , xj).
The same notation is used to represent sequences of random variables, i.e.,Xj = (X1, X2, . . . , Xj).
Note that this notation is used for sequences that have two subscripts the same way, i.e.,
Xjk = (Xk,1, Xk,2, . . . , Xk,j). Calligraphic letters such as X ,Y ,A,B, . . . represent finite
sets, and |X | denotes the cardinality of the finite set X . Cartesian product of two sets A
and B is denoted by A×B, and An stands for n times cartesian product of A. The set of
natural numbers is represented by N, and R denotes the set of real numbers. For a real
number a, ⌊a⌋ is the largest integer less than or equal to a, and ⌈a⌉ is the smallest integer
greater than or equal to a. Furthermore, let f(.) and g(.) be two real functions on the
set of real numbers; we write f(a) = O(g(a)) if and only if there exists a real constant
c such that for all a ∈ R, we have |f(a)| ≤ c|g(a)|. We use the notation fn = O(gn) for
real sequences {fn}n∈N and {gn}n∈N in the same manner.
The probability mass function (pmf) of a random variable X is represented by pX(x).
When it is obvious from the context, we drop the subscript and use p(x) instead of pX(x).
We say that Xn is drawn i.i.d. from p(x) if
p(xn) =
n∏
i=1
p(xi).
We use ∆(A) to denote the probability simplex on alphabet A, i.e., the set of all proba-
bility distributions on the finite set A. The total variation distance between pmfs pX and
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qX is denoted by ‖pX − qX‖TV and is defined as:
‖pX − qX‖TV , 1
2
∑
x∈X
|pX(x)− qX(x)|.
Some of the properties of the total variation distance are summarized in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. The following properties hold for the total variation distance:
Property 1: ‖pEpF |E − qEpF |E‖TV = ‖pE − qE‖TV ;
Property 2: ‖pEpF |E − qEqF |E‖TV ≥ ‖pE − qE‖TV ;
Property 3: ‖pE1pF1 − pE2qF2‖TV ≤ ‖pE1 − pE2‖TV + ‖pF1 − qF2‖TV .
2.2. Shannon Entropy
LetX ∈ X and Y ∈ Y be two random variables with joint probability distribution pXY
and respective marginal distributions pX and pY . The Shannon entropy of the random
variable X is defined to be:
H(X) =
∑
x∈X
−pX(x) log(pX(x)),
where 0 log(0) = 0 by continuity, and all logarithms in this paper are in base two. Since
the Shannon entropy is a function of the pmf pX , we sometimes write H(pX) instead of
H(X).
The conditional Shannon entropy of X given Y is defined as:
H(X|Y ) =
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
−pXY (x, y) log(pX|Y (x|y))
=
∑
y∈Y
pY (y)H(X|Y = y),
where H(X|Y = y) =∑x∈X −pX|Y (x|y) log(pX|Y (x|y)).
The following properties hold for the entropy function:
• H(X) ≥ 0.
• For arbitrary deterministic function f(x), we have H(f(X)) ≤ H(X).
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2.3. Re´nyi Entropy
Let X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y be two random variables with joint probability distribution
pXY and respective marginal distributions pX and pY . For arbitrary α > 0, the Re´nyi
entropy of random variable X with parameter α is defined as follows:
Hα(X) =
α
1− α log

(∑
x∈X
pX(x)
α
) 1
α

 = α
1− α log ‖pX‖α,
where ‖pX‖α =
(∑
x∈X pX(x)
α
) 1
α is the α-norm of pX . Since the Re´nyi entropy is a
function of the pmf pX , we sometimes write Hα(pX) instead of Hα(X).
The conditional Re´nyi entropy of X given Y with parameter α is defined as:
Hα(X|Y ) = α
1− α log
(∑
y∈Y
pY (y)‖pX|Y=y‖α
)
,
where pX|Y=y is the conditional distribution of X given Y = y.
Re´nyi entropy is related to Shannon entropy by the following relations:
lim
α→1
Hα(X) = H(X), lim
α→1
Hα(X|Y ) = H(X|Y ).
Let us fix X ∈ X and consider Hα(X) as a function of α. Hα(X) is analytic for all
α ≥ 0, and hence, differentiable of all orders. In this paper, we are interested in the values
of Re´nyi entropy for 1/2 ≤ α ≤ 2. Particularly, for α = 1 we have:
d1(X) , − d
dα
Hα(X)
∣∣∣
α=1
=
1
2 log e
(∑
x∈X
p(x)(log(p(x)))2 −H(X)2
)
.
Note that H(X) =
∑
x∈X p(x) log(p(x)), and function f(a) = a
2 is convex. Therefore,
Jensen’s inequality implies that d1(X) is non-negative. Using the Taylor expansion, for
1/2 ≤ α ≤ 2, we have:
Hα(X) = H(X)− d1(X)(α− 1) +RX(α), (3)
where the remainder RX(α) is bounded as
|RX(α)| ≤ d2(X)(α− 1)2, (4)
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where
d2(X) =
1
2
max
1/2≤α′≤2
∣∣∣∣d2Hα(X)dα2
∣∣∣
α=α′
∣∣∣∣ .
Since d1(X) and d2(X) are functions of pX , instead of them, we will sometimes write
d1(pX) and d2(pX), respectively. Similarly, for the conditional Re´nyi entropy and for
1/2 ≤ α ≤ 2, we have
Hα(X|Y ) = H(X|Y )− d1(X|Y )(α− 1) +RX|Y (α), (5)
where RX|Y (α) is the remainder term, and
d1(X|Y ) = − d
dα
Hα(X|Y )
∣∣∣
α=1
=
∑
y∈Y
pY (y)d(pX|Y=y) +
1
2 log e
(∑
y∈Y
pY (y)H(X|Y = y)2 −H(X|Y )2
)
.
Again, Jensen’s inequality implies that d1(X|Y ) is non-negative. Moreover, the remainder
RX|Y (α) is bounded as
|RX(α)| ≤ d2(X|Y )(α− 1)2, (6)
where
d2(X|Y ) = 1
2
max
1/2≤α′≤2
∣∣∣∣d2Hα(X|Y )dα2
∣∣∣
α=α′
∣∣∣∣ .
A more detailed analysis of the Re´nyi entropy with respect to the parameter α can be
found in (Beck and Scho¨gl, 1995, Section 5).
3. Repeated games with leaked randomness source: convergence rate
In this section, we revisit the repeated game of Gossner and Vieille (2002). Here, we fo-
cus on its general version with a leaked randomness source studied by Valizadeh and Gohari
(2017). Valizadeh and Gohari (2017) characterized the max-min value of the repeated
game when the number of the stages of the game tends to infinity. In contrast, we let the
number of stages of the game be fixed to n ∈ N, and investigate the rate by which the
max-min value of the n-stage game converges to the long-run max-min value.
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3.1. Problem statement and results
Consider an n stage repeated zero-sum game between players Alice(A) and Bob(B)
with respective pure action sets A and B. Let X and Y be the alphabet of randomness
sources of Alice and Bob, respectively, and let pXY be a publicly known pmf on X ×
Y . At each stage t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, random variables Xt ∈ X and Yt ∈ Y are drawn
independent of previous drawings according to pXY , where Xt is observed by Alice and
Yt is observed by Bob. Then, Alice and Bob choose respective actions At ∈ A and
Bt ∈ B. At the end of stage t, players monitor the chosen actions At and Bt, and
Alice gets stage payoff uAtBt from Bob. In order to choose At and Bt, players use the
history of their observations until stage t. Let Ht1 = (X1, A1, B1, . . . , Xt−1, At−1, Bt−1, Xt)
and Ht2 = (Y1, A1, B1, . . . , Yt−1, At−1, Bt−1, Yt) denote the history of observation of Alice
and Bob (respectively) up to stage t. Then, At = σt(H
t
1) and Bt = τt(H
t
2), where σt :
(A × B)t−1 × X t → A and τt : (A × B)t−1 × Y t → B are deterministic functions by
which Alice and Bob map their observations into their actions at stage t. Notice that the
mappings σt and τt are deterministic which means that the only source of randomization
are Ht1 (for Alice) and H
t
2 (for Bob). We call the n-tuples σ
n = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn) and
τn = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn) the strategies of Alice and Bob, respectively. The expected average
payoff for Alice up to stage n induced by strategies σn and τn is denoted by λ(σn, τn):
λ(σn, τn) = Eσn,τn
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
uAtBt
]
, (7)
where Eσn,τn denotes the expectation with respect to the distribution induced by i.i.d.
repetitions of pXY and strategies σ
n and τn. Alice wishes to maximize λ(σn, τn) and Bob’s
goal is to minimize it.
We will refer to the above game with “the repeated game with leaked randomness
source”. Another variant of this game, called “the repeated game with non-causal leaked
randomness source” is defined in the following remark.
Remark 2. In the definition of the repeated game with leaked randomness source, we
assumed that the randomness sources Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn) and Y
n = (Y1, . . . , Yn) are
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revealed to Alice and Bob causally as the game is played out. However, we can also
consider the non-causal case in which the sources Xn and Y n are observed by Alice and
Bob (respectively) before the game starts. In this case we have Ht1 = (X
n, At−1, Bt−1)
and Ht2 = (Y
n, At−1, Bt−1). In order to distinguish the above two cases, we name the
non-causal game as “the repeated game with non-causal leaked randomness source”.
Definition 3. Let v be an arbitrary real value:
• Alice can secure v in the n stage repeated game if there exists a strategy σn for Alice
such that for all strategy τn of Bob we have λ(σn, τn) ≥ v. The maximum of the set
of payoffs v that Alice can secure in the n stage repeated game is called the max-min
value of the n-stage game.
• Alice can secure v in long run if there exists a sequence of strategies {σn}n∈N for Al-
ice such that for all sequences of strategies {τn}n∈N of Bob we have lim infn→∞ λ(σn, τn) ≥
v. The supremum of the set of payoffs v that Alice can secure in long run is called
the long run max-min value of the game.
The set of all payoffs that can be secured in long run in the repeated game with leaked
randomness source is characterized by Valizadeh and Gohari (2017) and restated here as
Theorem 5. Before presenting Theorem 5, we need the following definition.
Definition 4. In a stage game, the security level of mixed action pA for Alice is denoted
by U (A)(pA), and is defined as follows:
U (A)(pA) = min
b∈B
∑
a∈A
pA(a)uab. (8)
Furthermore, the maximum payoff that Alice can secure in a stage game, by playing mixed
actions of entropy at most h, is denoted by J (A)(h), and is defined as:
J (A)(h) = max
pA∈∆(A),H(pA)≤h
U (A)(pA). (9)
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Theorem 5 (Valizadeh and Gohari (2017)). Let J (A)cav (h) be the upper concave envelope
of J (A)(h) defined in Definition 4. In the repeated game with leaked randomness source,
Alice can secure v in long run if and only if v ≤ J (A)cav (H(X|Y )). Furthermore, in n ∈ N
stage game, Alice can secure v only if v ≤ J (A)cav (H(X|Y )).
Theorem 5 implies that the long run max-min value of the repeated game with leaked
randomness source is J (A)cav (H(X|Y )). Moreover, the max-min value of the n-stage game
is at most J (A)cav (H(X|Y )). In the following theorems we discuss how the max-min value
of the n-stage game converges to J (A)cav (H(X|Y )) as n increases.
Theorem 6. In the repeated game with leaked randomness source, there exist real numbers
r > 0, β > 0, γ ≥ 0 and µ ≥ 0, such that the following property holds: for arbitrary
sequences {fn}n∈N, {gn}n∈N and {hn}n∈N satisfying fn ∈ N, 0 ≤ gn ≤ r, and 0 ≤ hn ≤ 1,
one can find a sequence of strategies {σn}n∈N such that for all sequences of strategies
{τn}n∈N of Bob and for all n ∈ N we have
λ(σn, τn) ≥ J (A)
cav
(H(X|Y ))− µ
(
1
n
+
1
fn
+
fn
n
+ gn + 2
− 1
2(
n
fn
−1)hn(βgn−γhn)
)
. (10)
We give an intuitive description of the terms in Equation (10) in Discussion 8 below.
The formal proof of Theorem 6 is presented in Section 3.3.
Corollary 7. In the repeated game with leaked randomness source, for each n ∈ N, let
vn denote the max-min value of the n-stage game. vn converges to J (A)cav (H(X|Y )) with
a rate of at least
√
logn/ 4
√
n. To see this, let r, β, γ, µ be the values in the statement of
Theorem 6, and let k be an arbitrary positive number such that β > kγ and kr ≤ 1.
Define fn = ⌈kr2(β − kγ)
√
n⌉, gn = r
√
log n/ 4
√
n, and hn = kgn. Then, Theorem 6
implies that there exists a sequence of strategies {σn}n∈N such that for all sequences of
strategies {τn}n∈N of Bob, and for all n ∈ N, we have
λ(σn, τn) ≥ J (A)
cav
(H(X|Y ))−O (gn) = J (A)cav (H(X|Y ))−O
(√
log n
4
√
n
)
.
To see this, observe that 1
n
+ 1
fn
+ fn
n
is decaying faster than gn. And
2−
1
2
( n
fn
−1)hn(βgn−γhn) = O
(
2−
√
ng2n
2r2
)
= O
(
1√
n
)
.
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Discussion 8. We explain Equation (10) at an intuitive level. To generate the strategies
{σn}n∈N of Theorem 6, we divide the total n stages almost uniformly into fn blocks such
that the actions of each block (besides the first block) is generated as a function of the
randomness source observed during the previous block, and in all stages of the first block,
an arbitrary action a ∈ A is played. Therefore, some payoff is lost during the first block;
the term 1/fn in Equation (10) corresponds with this loss. On the other hand, by dividing
the total stages into fn blocks we get blocks of length at least n/fn − 1. This affects the
precision of the simulation of the intended distribution of actions from the randomness
source observed in previous block, which is reflected in the term
2−
1
2
( n
fn
−1)hn(βgn−γhn). (11)
This equation should be compared with (2), where the exponent of the simulation error is
expressed as the product of three terms: the block length, a term 1− 1/α, and the entropy
difference Hα(X|Y )−H 1
α
(A). The term n/fn − 1 appears in Equation (11) as the block
length (the lengths of each of the fn blocks is at least n/fn− 1). The sequence hn = α− 1
is a proxy for the term 1 − 1/α. Finally, considering the last term Hα(X|Y ) − H 1
α
(A),
we see that larger entropy difference yields better simulation performance. On the other
hand, requirement of a large entropy difference restricts the set of action distributions A
and results in a payoff loss. The sequence gn is responsible for this trade-off. Larger gn
results in more loss in payoff (the term gn in Equation 10) but a more accurate simulation
(the term gn in the exponent of the exponential term in Equation 10).
Next, consider the repeated game with non-causal leaked randomness source (see Re-
mark 2), where the players observe the whole sequence of their corresponding randomness
sources before the game starts. We claim the following result:
Theorem 9. In the repeated game with non-causal leaked randomness source (as described
in Remark 2), there exist real numbers r > 0, β > 0, γ ≥ 0 and µ ≥ 0 with the following
property: for arbitrary sequences of positive numbers {gn}n∈N and {hn}n∈N satisfying
gn ≤ r and hn ≤ 1, there exists a sequence of strategies {σn}n∈N such that for all sequences
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of strategies {τn}n∈N of Bob and for all n ∈ N we have
λ(σn, τn) ≥ J (A)
cav
(H(X|Y ))− µ
(
1
n
+ gn + 2
− 1
2
nhn(βgn−γhn)
)
. (12)
Proof of Theorem 9 is given in Section 3.4.
Corollary 10. In the repeated game with non-causal leaked randomness source, for each
n ∈ N, let v′n denote the max-min value of the n-stage game. v′n converges to J (A)cav (H(X|Y ))
with a rate of at least
√
log n/
√
n. To see this, let r, β, γ, µ be the values in the statement
of Theorem 9, and let k be an arbitrary positive number such that β > kγ and rk ≤ 1.
Define gn = min{r, ( lognk(β−kγ)n)
1
2}, and hn = kgn. Then, using similar calculations as in
Corollary 7, Theorem 9 implies that there exists a sequence of strategies {σn}n∈N such
that for all sequences of strategies {τn}n∈N of Bob, and for all n ∈ N, we have
λ(σn, τn) ≥ J (A)
cav
(H(X|Y ))−O
(√
log n√
n
)
.
Theorem 6 and Theorem 9 provide a convergence rate for general games. However,
in some special cases we can derive faster convergence rates for the max-min value of the
game. The following theorem provides a special case in which an exponential convergence
is obtained.
Theorem 11. Let qA ∈ ∆(A) be an equilibrium strategy for Alice in the one stage game,
i.e.,
qA ∈ argmax
pA∈∆(A)
min
b∈B
∑
a∈A
pA(a)uab.
IfH(X|Y ) > H(qA), then, in the repeated game with non-causal leaked randomness source,
there exist real numbers β, γ > 0, and a sequence of strategies {σn}n∈N such that for all
sequences of strategies {τn}n∈N of Bob and for all n ∈ N, we have
λ(σn, τn) ≥ J (A)
cav
(H(X|Y ))− γ2−βn. (13)
The proof of Theorem 11 is provided in Section 3.5.
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3.2. A technical tool: simulation of a source from another source
To prove the results of Section 3.1, we need a technical tool provided in this section.
Here, we study the simulation of a desired single letter source A ∈ A from a given single
letter source X ∈ X . We assume that X is correlated with a side information Y ∈ Y ,
and we would like the generated source to be almost independent of the side information
Y . More precisely, we have the following definition:
Definition 12. Let (X, Y ) ∈ X × Y be distributed according to pXY , and A ∈ A be
distributed according to pA. We say that the deterministic mapping f : X → A simulates
A from X with precision ǫ if we have
‖pf(X)Y − pApY ‖TV ≤ ǫ,
where pf(X)Y is the joint distribution of f(X) and Y .
According to the above definition, we are interested in a deterministic mapping that
simulates A from X . However, we utilize the probabilistic method and random mappings,
as a tool to ultimately prove existence of a suitable deterministic mapping. Therefore,
we now define a random mapping and proceed by proving some properties for it. These
properties will then lead to the construction of the desired deterministic mapping.
To specify a deterministic mapping f : X → A, we need to specify the value of f(x)
for all x ∈ X . To specify a random mapping F : X → A, we need to specify the joint
distribution of the random variables F (x) for x ∈ X .
Definition 13. F : X → A is a random mapping constructed as follows: assume that
F (x) for different values of x are i.i.d. according to pA(a). In other words, given string
of symbols ax ∈ A for all x ∈ X ,
Pr[F (x) = ax, ∀x ∈ X ] =
∏
x∈X
Pr[F (x) = ax] =
∏
x∈X
pA(ax),
The above construction of the random mapping F defines a probability measure pF on the
set of all mappings f : X → A denoted by F .
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Lemma 14. Let (X, Y ) ∈ X × Y be distributed according to pXY and A ∈ A according
to pA. Furthermore, let F be the random mapping defined in Definition 13. Then,
∑
f∈F
pF (f)‖pf(X)Y − pApY ‖TV ≤ min
α∈[1,2]
(
2
−(1− 1
α
)
(
Hα(X|Y )−H 1
α
(A)+2
))
, (14)
where pf(X)Y is the joint distribution of f(X) and Y . Consequently, there exists a deter-
ministic mapping f : X → A such that for all α ∈ [1, 2], we have
‖pf(X)Y − pApY ‖TV ≤ 2
−(1− 1
α
)
(
Hα(X|Y )−H 1
α
(A)+2
)
. (15)
Proof of Lemma 14 is provided in Appendix A.
While the above inequality ensures the existence of a deterministic mapping f : X → A
where (15) holds, it does not provide an explicit mapping f . An explicit construction is
desirable from an algorithmic perspective. In the following, we address this issue by
showing that any randomly chosen mapping f : X → A would almost satisfy (15) with
very high probability.
Let DTV = ‖pF (X)Y − pApY ‖TV . The quantity DTV is random because F is random.
Thus, random variable DTV is a function of the random variable F , i.e., DTV takes value
‖pf(X)Y−pApY ‖TV with probability pF (f). Hence, Lemma 14 implies that for all α ∈ [1, 2],
E[DTV ] ≤ 2
−(1− 1
α
)
(
Hα(X|Y )−H 1
α
(A)+2
)
.
We claim the following bound on how DTV concentrates around its expected value.
Proposition 15. For the random variable DTV , we have
Pr
[∣∣DTV − E[DTV ]∣∣ > t] ≤ 2e−2t22H2(X).
Proof of Proposition 15 is presented in Appendix B.
One application of Proposition 15 is for simulation of i.i.d. sequences. Let (Xn, Y n) be
i.i.d. according to pXY , and let A
n be i.i.d. according to pA. Assume thatH(X|Y ) > H(A)
so that simulation of An with arbitrary precision is possible. Let F : X n → An be the
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random mapping of Definition 13, where (X, Y,A) is replaced with (Xn, Y n, An). Let us
choose α > 1 such that Hα(X|Y ) > H 1
α
(A) (note that such a real number exists since
H(X|Y ) > H(A), and Re´nyi entropy converges to Shannon entropy as α tends to 1). Let
ǫ be a positive number such that
ǫ ≤
(
1− 1
α
)(
Hα(X|Y )−H 1
α
(A)
)
, ǫ <
1
2
H2(X).
Then, Lemma 14 implies
E[DTV ] ≤ 2−ǫn, (16)
where DTV = ‖pF (Xn)Y n − pAnpY n‖TV . Furthermore, from Proposition 15, for t = 2−ǫn,
we have
Pr
[∣∣DTV − E[DTV ]∣∣ > 2−ǫn] ≤ 2e−2(H2(X)−2ǫ)n.
The above equation along with Equation (16) and definition δ = H2(X)− 2ǫ implies
Pr[DTV ≥ 2× 2−ǫn] ≤ 2e−2δn.
In other words, the outcome of the random mapping F , with probability at least 1−2e−2δn
(converging double exponentially to 1) will simulate An with precision at most 2 × 2−ǫn
(decaying exponentially in n).
3.3. Proof of Theorem 6
Let us divide the total stages, n, into fn blocks, where {fn}n∈N is the arbitrary sequence
of natural numbers in the statement of the theorem. Let kn be the remainder of n divided
by fn, i.e., n = ⌊n/fn⌋fn + kn. Then, the number of stages in each block, {Nn,i}fni=1, is
computed as follows:
Nn,i =


⌊n/fn⌋ + 1 i = 1, . . . , kn
⌊n/fn⌋ i = kn + 1, . . . , fn.
(17)
In other words, first, all blocks get ⌊n/fn⌋ stages, then, the remaining kn stages are
assigned to the first kn blocks.
19
Let A
Nn,i
i = (Ai,1, Ai,2, . . . , Ai,Nn,i) and B
Nn,i
i = (Bi,1, Bi,2, . . . , Bi,Nn,i) denote the se-
quence of actions played in block i = 1, . . . , fn by Alice and Bob, respectively. Similarly,
let X
Nn,i
i = (Xi,1, Xi,2, . . . , Xi,Nn,i) and Y
Nn,i
i = (Yi,1, Yi,2, . . . , Yi,Nn,i) denote the sequence
of random sources observed in block i by Alice and Bob, respectively. We generate strat-
egy σn for Alice as follows: in all stages of the first block, Alice chooses an arbitrary action
a ∈ A; in each block i ≥ 2, Alice chooses her action sequence ANn,ii as a deterministic
function of the sequence of random sources observed during the previous block, X
Nn,i−1
i−1 .
Let us denote this deterministic function by ϕi. Thus, we have
A
Nn,i
i = ϕi(X
Nn,i−1
i−1 ).
In order to fulfill the definition of the strategy σn, it suffices to determine the functions
ϕi for i = 2, . . . , fn. We will now determine the functions ϕi after presenting some
preliminaries.
Considering the definition of the function J (A)cav (.), there exist real number 0 ≤ r ≤ 1
and pmfs p
(1)
A , p
(2)
A ∈ ∆(A) such that:
rU (A)(p
(1)
A ) + (1− r)U (A)(p(2)A ) = J (A)cav (H(X|Y )), (18)
rH(p
(1)
A ) + (1− r)H(p(2)A ) ≤ H(X|Y ). (19)
Without loss of generality, we may assume that H(p
(1)
A ) ≥ H(p(2)A ). The following lemma
claims that we may assume that r, p
(1)
A and p
(2)
A also satisfy the following equations:
H(p
(1)
A ) > H(p
(2)
A ), (20)
0 < r ≤ 1. (21)
Lemma 16. Theorem 6 holds if Equations (20) and (21) fail to hold.
Proof of the above lemma is given later in Section 3.3.1.
We identify the value of r in the statement of the theorem as the one given by Equations
(18) and (19). The values for β > 0, γ ≥ 0 and µ ≥ 0 will be identified later. Take an
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arbitrary sequence {gn}n∈N of positive numbers, as in the statement of the theorem, such
that gn ≤ r, for all n ∈ N. Let
mn,i = ⌊Nn,i(r − gn)⌋.
Moreover, consider an ideal distribution q
A
Nn,i
i
defined as follows for i = 2, . . . , fn:
q
A
Nn,i
i
(a
Nn,i
i ) =
mn,i∏
t=1
p
(1)
A (ai,t)
Nn,i∏
t=mn,i+1
p
(2)
A (ai,t). (22)
For each i = 2, . . . , fn, we choose ϕi to be the mapping of Lemma 14 that simulates qANn,ii
from X
Nn,i−1
i−1 ; hence, for all 1 ≤ α ≤ 2, we have
∥∥∥∥pANn,ii Y Nn,i−1i−1 − qANn,ii pY Nn,i−1i−1
∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ 2
−(1− 1
α
)
(
Hα
(
X
Nn,i−1
i−1
∣∣∣Y Nn,i−1i−1 )−H 1
α
(
q
A
Nn,i
i
)
+2
)
, (23)
where p
A
Nn,i
i Y
Nn,i−1
i−1
is the joint pmf of A
Nn,i
i and Y
Nn,i−1
i−1 . Next, note that
H1/α
(
q
A
Nn,i
i
)
= mn,iH1/α
(
p
(1)
A
)
+ (Nn,i −mn,i)H1/α
(
p
(2)
A
)
. (24)
On the other hand, since (X
Nn,i−1
i−1 , Y
Nn,i−1
i−1 ) are drawn i.i.d. from pXY , we have
Hα
(
X
Nn,i−1
i−1
∣∣∣Y Nn,i−1i−1 ) = Nn,i−1Hα (X|Y ) ≥ Nn,iHα (X|Y ) , (25)
where we used Nn,i−1 ≥ Nn,i, which follows from the definition given in Equation (17).
Moreover, let rn,i be a fractional approximation of r defined as follows
rn,i =
mn,i
Nn,i
.
Observe that
rn,i ≤ r − gn.
Equations (23), (24) and (25) imply∥∥∥∥pANn,ii Y Nn,i−1i−1 − qANn,ii pY Nn,i−1i−1
∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ 2−Nn,i(1− 1α )
(
Hα(X|Y )−rn,iH1/α
(
p
(1)
A
)
−(1−rn,i)H1/α
(
p
(2)
A
))
.
(26)
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Using Equations (3)-(6), we bound the exponent of the exponential term in the right-hand
side of the above equation as below:
Hα(X|Y )− rn,iH1/α
(
p
(1)
A
)
− (1− rn,i)H1/α
(
p
(2)
A
)
≥ H(X|Y )− rn,iH
(
p
(1)
A
)
− (1− rn,i)H
(
p
(2)
A
)
− (α− 1)d1(X|Y )+(
1
α
− 1
)(
rn,id1
(
p
(1)
A
)
+ (1− rn,i)d1
(
p
(2)
A
))
− (α− 1)2d2(X|Y )−
(
1
α
− 1
)2 (
rn,id2
(
p
(1)
A
)
+ (1− rn,i)d2
(
p
(2)
A
))
= H(X|Y )− rn,iH
(
p
(1)
A
)
− (1− rn,i)H
(
p
(2)
A
)
− (α− 1)
(
d1(X|Y ) + 1
α
(
rn,id1
(
p
(1)
A
)
+ (1− rn,i)d1
(
p
(2)
A
)))
− (α− 1)2
(
d2(X|Y ) + 1
α2
(
rn,id2
(
p
(1)
A
)
+ (1− rn,i)d2
(
p
(2)
A
)))
≥ H(X|Y )− rn,iH
(
p
(1)
A
)
− (1− rn,i)H
(
p
(2)
A
)
− (α− 1)
(
d1(X|Y ) + max
{
d1(p
(1)
A ), d1(p
(2)
A )
})
− (α− 1)2
(
d2(X|Y ) + max
{
d2(p
(1)
A ), d2(p
(2)
A )
})
. (27)
where in (27) we used the fact that 0 ≤ rn,i ≤ 1 and α ≥ 1. On the other hand,
Equations (19) and (20) along with the fact that rn,i ≤ r − gn imply
H(X|Y )− rn,iH
(
p
(1)
A
)
− (1− rn,i)H
(
p
(2)
A
)
≥ βgn, (28)
where
β , H(p
(1)
A )−H(p(2)A ) > 0.
Next, let us define
γ , 2max
{
d1(X|Y ) + max
{
d1(p
(1)
A ), d1(p
(2)
A )
}
, d2(X|Y ) + max
{
d2(p
(1)
A ), d2(p
(2)
A )
}}
.
Then, Equations (27) and (28) imply
Hα(X|Y )− rn,iH1/α
(
p
(1)
A
)
− (1− rn,i)H1/α
(
p
(2)
A
)
≥ βgn − 1
2
γ(α− 1 + (α− 1)2)
≥ βgn − γ(α− 1), (29)
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where (29) results from α ≤ 2. By using (29) in (26), and simplifications 1 − 1/α ≥
(α− 1)/2 and Nn,i ≥ n/fn − 1 we obtain∥∥∥∥pANn,ii Y Nn,i−1i−1 − qANn,ii pY Nn,i−1i−1
∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ 2− 12 ( nfn−1)(α−1)(βgn−γ(α−1)). (30)
Next, let α = 1+hn, where {hn}n∈N is the arbitrary sequence of positive real numbers in
the statement of the theorem. Then, Equation (30) results in∥∥∥∥pANn,ii Y Nn,i−1i−1 − qANn,ii pY Nn,i−1i−1
∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ 2− 12 ( nfn−1)hn(βgn−γhn) , δn. (31)
Now, we need to include the sequence of actions of Bob at the i-th block (B
Nn,i
i ) into
Equation (31). To do so, note that A
Nn,i
i is independent of Alice’s actions in all blocks,
except for the i-th block. This is because the X-source is i.i.d. and A
Nn,i
i is a function
of X
Nn,i−1
i−1 . Therefore, at t-th stage of block number i, Bob obtains information about
X
Nn,i−1
i−1 only through his source Y
Nn,i−1
i−1 and prior actions A
t−1
i−1. In other words, Bi,t is
conditionally independent of X
Nn,i−1
i−1 given Y
Nn,i−1
i−1 , A
t−1
i , B
t−1
i . Since A
Nn,i
i = ϕi(X
Nn,i−1
i−1 ),
Bi,t is also conditionally independent of Ai,t, Ai,t+1, · · · , Ai,Nn,i given Y Nn,i−1i−1 , At−1i , Bt−1i .
Thus,
p
B
Nn,i
i |A
Nn,i
i Y
Nn,i−1
i−1
=
Nn,i∏
t=1
p
Bi,t|A
t−1
i Y
Nn,i−1
i−1 B
t−1
i
.
Then, utilizing the first property of total variation in Lemma 1 for random variables
E = (A
Nn,i
i , Y
Nn,i−1
i−1 ) and F = B
Nn,i
i we conclude from (31) that
∥∥∥∥pANn,ii Y Nn,i−1i−1 BNn,ii − qANn,ii pY Nn,i−1i−1
Nn,i∏
t=1
p
Bi,t|A
t−1
i Y
Nn,i−1
i−1 B
t−1
i
∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ δn.
Next, by utilizing the second property of total variation in Lemma 1 for random variables
E = (A
Nn,i
i , B
Nn,i
i ) and F = Y
Nn,i−1
i−1 , and replacing qANn,ii
from Equation (22) we conclude
∥∥∥∥pANn,ii BNn,ii (aNn,i , bNn,i)−
mn,i∏
t=1
p
(1)
A (at)pBi,t|At−1i B
t−1
i
(bt|at−1, bt−1)×
Nn,i∏
t=mn,i+1
p
(2)
A (at)pBi,t|At−1i B
t−1
i
(bt|at−1, bt−1)
∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ δn. (32)
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In other words, the distribution of the generated actions A
Nn,i
i is in distance δn from the
ideal distribution q
A
Nn,i
i
. Note that the ideal distribution q
A
Nn,i
i
secures payoffmn,iU
(A)(p
(1)
A )+
(Nn,i−mn,i)U (A)(q(2)A ) in the i-th block. Therefore, in the i-th block, the generated strat-
egy σn secures payoff
mn,iU
(A)(p
(1)
A ) + (Nn,i −mn,i)U (A)(p(2)A )− 2Nn,iMδn,
where M = maxa∈A,b∈B |uab|. Thus, for arbitrary strategy τn of Bob we have
λ(σn, τn) ≥ 1
n
{
−MNn,1 +
fn∑
i=2
(
mn,iU
(A)(p
(1)
A ) + (Nn,i −mn,i)U (A)(p(2)A )− 2Nn,iMδn
)}
≥ 1
n
{
−MNn,1 +
fn∑
i=2
Nn,i
(
J (A)cav (H(X|Y ))−
(
gn +
1
Nn,i
)
∆U − 2Mδn
)}
(33)
≥ J (A)cav (H(X|Y ))−∆U
(
fn
n
+ gn
)
− 2Mδn − Nn,1
n
(
M+ J (A)cav (H(X|Y ))
)
(34)
≥ J (A)cav (H(X|Y ))−∆U
(
fn
n
+ gn
)
− 2Mδn − 2M
(
1
fn
+
1
n
)
, (35)
where ∆U = |U (A)(p(1)A )−U (A)(p(2)A )|, and inequality (33) follows from Equation (18) and
the fact that |mn,i − rNn,i| ≤ gnNn,i + 1; Equation (34) is implied by
∑fn
i=1Nn,i = n, and
(35) results from J (A)cav (H(X|Y )) ≤ M and Nn,1 ≤ n/fn + 1.
Note that Equation (20) implies that β > 0; therefore, by replacing the value of δn,
and defining µ = max{2M,∆U}, (35) implies the claim of the theorem.
3.3.1. Proof of Lemma 16
We need to consider the case of r = 0 or H(p
(1)
A ) = H(p
(2)
A ).
• The case of r = 0 and H(p(2)A ) = 0: here, p(2)A is deterministic (it outputs an action
a ∈ A with probability 1), and hence, the trivial strategy of playing a in all stages
secures payoff J (A)cav (H(X|Y )) for Alice; therefore, in this case, the claim of the
theorem holds with µ = 0.
• The case of r = 0 and H(p(2)A ) > 0: in this case, let r′ = 1, q(1)A = p(2)A , and let q(2)A be
an arbitrary deterministic pmf. Then, r′, q
(1)
A and q
(2)
A satisfy Equations (18)-(21).
Therefore, we can proceed with the proof of Theorem 6 with these assumptions.
24
• If H(p(1)A ) = H(p(2)A ) = 0, then Alice can achieve J (A)cav (H(X|Y )) by playing a pure
action, and the claim of the theorem holds with µ = 0.
• If r = 1 and H(p(1)A ) = H(p(2)A ) > 0, then, we can change p(2)A to an arbitrary
deterministic pmf so that Equations (18)-(21) hold. Therefore, we can proceed with
the proof of Theorem 6 with these assumptions.
• If 0 < r < 1 and H(p(1)A ) = H(p(2)A ) > 0, then, we can change r to r = 1, and p(2)A to
a deterministic pmf such that Equations (18)-(21) hold. This is because 0 < r < 1
and H(p
(1)
A ) = H(p
(2)
A ) > 0 imply that U
(A)(p
(1)
A ) = U
(A)(p
(2)
A ), since otherwise, by
changing r we would get greater value for J (A)cav (H(X|Y )), which contradicts the
definition of the upper concave envelope.
3.4. Proof of Theorem 9
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 6 with few modifications. More specif-
ically, in a repeated game with non-causal leaked randomness source we do not need
to divide the total n stages into blocks; instead, we can generate all actions of Al-
ice as a function of the whole randomness source. Let An = (A1, A2, . . . , An) and
Bn = (B1, B2, . . . , Bn) denote the sequences of actions of Alice and Bob, and let X
n =
(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) and Y
n = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn) denote the sequences of random sources of
Alice and Bob, respectively. We generate strategy σn for Alice such that Alice chooses
her action sequence An as a deterministic function of Xn, i.e.,
An = ϕn(X
n).
We will now determine the function ϕn after presenting some preliminaries.
As stated in the proof of Theorem 6 in Section 3.3, we assume that there exist real
number r and pmfs p
(1)
A , p
(2)
A ∈ ∆(A) satisfying (18)-(21). Moreover, let
mn = ⌊n(r − gn)⌋,
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and let qAn be an ideal distribution of actions defined as follows:
qAn(a
n) =
mn∏
t=1
p
(1)
A (at)
n∏
t=mn+1
p
(2)
A (at). (36)
We choose ϕn to be the mapping of Lemma 14 that simulates qAn from X
n; hence, for all
1 ≤ α ≤ 2 we have
‖pAnY n − qAnpY n‖TV ≤ 2
−(1− 1
α
)
(
Hα(Xn|Y n)−H 1
α
(qAn)+2
)
. (37)
Next, note that H1/α (qAn) = mnH1/α
(
p
(1)
A
)
+ (n − mn)H1/α
(
p
(2)
A
)
, and Hα (X
n|Y n) =
nHα (X|Y ). Thus, defining rn = mn/n, Equation 37 implies
‖pAnY n − qAnpY n‖TV ≤ 2−n(1−
1
α
)
(
Hα(X|Y )−rnH1/α
(
p
(1)
A
)
−(1−rn)H1/α
(
p
(2)
A
))
. (38)
A similar argument as the one used to prove Equation (29) in Section 3.3 implies
Hα(X|Y )− rnH1/α
(
p
(1)
A
)
− (1− rn)H1/α
(
p
(2)
A
)
≥ βgn − γ(α− 1), (39)
where β = H(p
(1)
A )−H(p(2)A ), and
γ = 2max
{
d1(X|Y ) + max
{
d1(p
(1)
A ), d1(p
(2)
A )
}
, d2(X|Y ) + max
{
d2(p
(1)
A ), d2(p
(2)
A )
}}
.
By using (39) in (38), and simplification 1− 1/α ≥ (α− 1)/2, we obtain
‖pAnY n − qAnpY n‖TV ≤ 2− 12n(α−1)(βgn−γ(α−1)). (40)
Next, let α = 1+hn, where {hn}n∈N is the arbitrary sequence of positive real numbers in
the statement of the theorem; hence, Equation (40) results in
‖pAnY n − qAnpY n‖TV ≤ 2− 12nhn(βgn−γhn) , δ′n. (41)
Now, we need to include the sequence of actions of Bob (Bn) into Equation (41). Note
that at each stage t, Bob has access to information (Y t−1, At−1, Bt−1); thus, given an
arbitrary strategy τn for Bob, we have
pBn|AnY n =
n∏
t=1
pBt|Y nAt−1Bt−1 .
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Then, using a similar argument as we used in Section 3.3 to prove Equation 32, the above
equation along with Equation (41) implies∥∥∥∥pAnBn(an, bn)−
mn∏
t=1
p
(1)
A (at)pBt|At−1Bt−1(bt|at−1, bt−1)×
n∏
t=mn+1
p
(2)
A (at)pBt|At−1Bt−1(bt|at−1, bt−1)
∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ δ′n. (42)
In other words, the distribution of the generated actions is in distance δ′n from the ideal
distribution. Note that the ideal distribution qAn secures payoff mnU
(A)(p
(1)
A ) + (n −
mn)U
(A)(q
(2)
A ). Therefore, we have
λ(σn, τn) ≥ 1
n
{
mnU
(A)(p
(1)
A ) + (n−mn)U (A)(p(2)A )− 2nMδ′n
}
≥ Jcav(H(X|Y ))−∆U(gn + 1
n
)− 2Mδ′n,
where M = maxa∈A,b∈B |uab|, ∆U = |U (A)(p(1)A ) − U (A)(p(2)A )|, and the second inequality
follows from Equation (18) along with the fact that |mn− rn| ≤ gnn+1. By replacing δ′n
and defining µ = max{2M,∆U}, we obtain the claim of the theorem.
3.5. Proof of Theorem 11
The inequality H(X|Y ) > H(qA) along with the fact that qA is an equilibrium strategy
for Alice in the stage game implies that
J (A)cav (H(X|Y )) = U (A)(qA). (43)
If Alice could play i.i.d. according to qA, she would have secured payoff U
(A)(qA). Our
goal is to generate the actions of Alice, An, as a deterministic function of the randomness
source Xn in such a way that at every stage t, the distribution of the action At is almost
qA and is almost independent of the past observations of Bob.
The strategy σn is defined as follows: the actions An are chosen as a deterministic
function of Xn, i.e., An = ϕn(X
n). We will now define the mapping ϕn. Consider an
ideal distribution qAn defined as below:
qAn(a
n) =
n∏
t=1
qA(at). (44)
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Let ϕn be the mapping of Lemma 14 that simulates qAn from X
n; hence, for all 1 ≤ α ≤ 2,
we have
‖pAnY n − qAnpY n‖TV ≤ 2
−(1− 1
α
)
(
Hα(Xn|Y n)−H 1
α
(qAn)+2
)
, (45)
where pAnY n is the joint pmf of A
n and Y n. Note that (Xn, Y n) are drawn i.i.d. from
pXY , and qAn is i.i.d. as well, thus, we have
Hα(X
n|Y n)−H1/α(qAn) = n(Hα(X|Y )−H1/α(qA)). (46)
Furthermore, let β be defined as follows
β = sup
1<α≤2
(1− 1
α
)
(
Hα(X|Y )−H 1
α
(qA)
)
.
Note that limα→1
(
Hα(X|Y )−H1/α(qA)
)
= H(X|Y ) −H(qA) > 0; hence, β > 0. Equa-
tions (45) and (46) along with the above definition of β imply
‖pAnY n − qAnpY n‖TV ≤ 2−βn. (47)
Next, let Bob play an arbitrary strategy τn and let Bn denote the sequence of actions of
Bob. At stage t, Bob generates Bt as a function of Y
n and his previous observations At−1
and Bt−1. Hence, we have
pBn|AnY n =
n∏
t=1
pBt|Y nAt−1Bt−1 .
Then, utilizing the first property of total variation in Lemma 1 for random variables
E = (An, Y n) and F = Bn, we conclude from (47) that∥∥∥∥∥pAnY nBn − qAnpY n
n∏
t=1
pBt|At−1Y nBt−1
∥∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ 2−βn.
Next, by utilizing the second property of total variation in Lemma 1 for random variables
E = (An, Bn) and F = Y n, and replacing qAn from Equation (44) we conclude∥∥∥∥pAnBn(an, bn)−
n∏
t=1
qA(at)pBt|At−1Bt−1(bt|at−1, bt−1)
∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ 2−βn. (48)
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In other words, the distribution of the generated actions pAnBn is in distance 2
−βn from the
ideal distribution
∏n
t=1 qA(at)pBt|At−1Bt−1(bt|at−1, bt−1). Note that the ideal distribution
secures payoff U (A)(qA) for Alice. Therefore, Equation (48) implies that
λ(σn, τn) ≥ U (A)(qA)− 2M2−βn,
where M = maxa∈A,b∈B |uab|. Note that τn is an arbitrary strategy for Bob, therefore, the
above inequality along with (43) implies the claim of the theorem.
4. Approximate Nash equilibria of the repeated game with leaked randomness
source
In the repeated game with leaked randomness source defined in Section 3.1, we have
forced the players to randomize their actions just by conditioning them to the outcomes of
the random sources Xn and Y n. In this setting, Nash equilibria do not necessarily exist
(See Huba´cˇek et al. (2016) and Budinich and Fortnow (2011)). However, approximate
Nash equilibria may exist. The goal of this section is to characterize the set of approximate
Nash equilibria achievable by the randomness sources Xn and Y n. To proceed, consider
the following definitions.
Definition 17. In the n stage repeated game, the strategy profile (σn, τn) is an (ǫA, ǫB)-
Nash equilibrium if Alice (resp. Bob) can not increase (resp. decrease) the expected average
payoff (defined in Equation (7)) more than ǫA (resp. ǫB) by changing her (resp. his)
strategy unilaterally.
Definition 18. We say v is a (ǫA, ǫB)-Nash equilibrium payoff if for arbitrary δ > 0 there
exists a natural number n0 and a sequence of strategy profiles {(σn, τn)}n∈N such that for
all n ≥ n0, (σn, τn) forms a (ǫA + δ, ǫB + δ)-Nash equilibrium, and |λ(σn, τn)− v| ≤ δ.
Definition 19. (ǫA, ǫB)-Nash equilibrium is achievable in long run if for all δ > 0, there
exists a natural number n0 such that for all n ≥ n0, in the n-stage repeated game, there
exists a (ǫA + δ, ǫB + δ)-Nash equilibrium.
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We will now characterize the set of all approximate Nash equilibria of the repeated
game with leaked randomness source. To do so, we first need to comment on the long run
security level of the players. As stated in Theorem 5, Alice can secure arbitrary payoff v
in long run if and only if v ≤ J (A)cav (H(X|Y )), where J (A)cav (.) is the upper concave envelope
of J (A)(.) defined in Definition 4. Using Theorem 5, we can derive a similar result from
Bob’s (the minimizer) point of view. Consider the following definitions:
Definition 20. Let v be an arbitrary real value:
• Bob can secure v in the n stage repeated game if there exists a strategy τn for Bob
such that for all strategy σn of Alice we have λ(σn, τn) ≤ v.
• Bob can secure v in long run if there exists a sequence of strategies {τn}n∈N for Bob
such that for all sequences of strategies {σn}n∈N of Alice we have lim supn→∞ λ(σn, τn) ≤
v.
Definition 21. In a stage game, the security level of mixed action pB for Bob is denoted
by U (B)(pB), and is defined as follows:
U (B)(pB) = max
a∈A
∑
b∈B
pB(b)uab. (49)
Furthermore, the minimum cost that Bob can secure in a stage game, by playing mixed
actions of entropy at most h, is denoted by J (B)(h), and is defined as:
J (B)(h) = min
pB∈∆(B),H(pB)≤h
U (B)(pB). (50)
Next, by replacing the stage payoff uab with −uab, and hence, considering Bob as the
maximizer, we can deduce the following corollary of Theorem 5.
Corollary 22. Let J (B)vex (h) be the lower convex envelope of J (B)(h) defined in Defini-
tion 21. In the repeated game with leaked randomness source, Bob can secure v in long
run if and only if v ≥ J (B)vex (H(Y |X)). Furthermore, in n ∈ N stage game, Bob can secure
v only if v ≥ J (B)vex (H(Y |X)).
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Note that the functions J (A)(h) and J (B)(h) are respectively increasing and decreasing
in h. On the other hand, the minimax theorem (Von Neumann (1928)) implies that
J (A)(+∞) = J (B)(+∞); thus, for arbitrary h and h′, we have J (B)(h) ≥ J (A)(h′).
Hence, J (B)vex (H(Y |X)) ≥ J (A)cav (H(X|Y )).
In the following theorem we characterize the set of achievable (ǫA, ǫB)-Nash equilibrium
payoffs in terms of the individually secured payoffs J (A)cav (H(X|Y )) and J (B)vex (H(Y |X)).
Theorem 23. In the repeated game with leaked randomness source defined in Section
3.1, v is a (ǫA, ǫB)-Nash equilibrium payoff if and only if
max{m,J (B)vex (H(Y |X))− ǫA} ≤ v ≤ min{m,J (A)cav (H(X|Y )) + ǫB}, (51)
where m and m are the maximum and minimum entries of the payoff table, respectively
(m = max(a,b)∈A×B uab, and m = min(a,b)∈A×B uab).
The proof of Theorem 23 is provided in Section 4.1.
Remark 24. If ǫA = ǫB = 0, the set of payoffs satisfying (51) is empty unless H(X|Y )
and H(Y |X) are large enough such that
J (A)cav (H(X|Y )) = J (B)vex (H(Y |X)) = v∗, (52)
where v∗ = maxpA∈∆(A)minpB∈∆(B)
∑
a∈A,b∈B pA(a)pB(b)uab. In this case, if (52) holds, the
only equilibrium payoff is v∗, i.e., the max-min value of the stage game. This particular
result coincides with the result of ”Folk-Theorem” for two-player zero-sum repeated games
in which players can freely randomize their actions.
We can refine Theorem 23 to characterize the set of ǫA and ǫB for which (ǫA, ǫB)-Nash
equilibrium is achievable in long run. Let ǫA and ǫB be arbitrary positive numbers. If
there exists a v satisfying Equation (51), then, Theorem 23 implies that (ǫA, ǫB)-Nash
equilibrium is achievable. On the other hand, let (σn, τn) form an (ǫA, ǫB)-Nash equi-
librium; then, Theorem 23 implies that v = λ(σn, τn) satisfies (51). In other words,
31
(ǫA, ǫB)-Nash equilibrium is achievable if and only if there exists a real number v satisfy-
ing (51). Therefore, by removing v from Equation (51), and rewriting it in terms of ǫA
and ǫB, we conclude the following corollary of Theorem 23.
Corollary 25. In the repeated game with leaked randomness source defined in Section
3.1, (ǫA, ǫB)-Nash equilibrium is achievable in long run if and only if
ǫA + ǫB ≥ J (B)vex (H(Y |X))−J (A)cav (H(X|Y )). (53)
4.1. Proof of Theorem 23
We prove that inequality (51) is both necessary and sufficient for v to be a (ǫA, ǫB)-
Nash equilibrium payoff.
Inequality (51) is necessary: In the n stage repeated game, let σn and τn be
arbitrary strategies for Alice and Bob generating an (ǫ′A, ǫ
′
B)-Nash equilibrium. According
to Corollary 22, given the strategy τn for Bob, there exists a strategy σ∗n for Alice such
that λ(σ∗n, τn) ≥ J (B)vex (H(Y |X)). Hence,
λ(σ∗n, τn)− λ(σn, τn) ≥ J (B)vex (H(Y |X))− λ(σn, τn).
But (σn, τn) is a (ǫ′A, ǫ
′
B)-Nash equilibrium, thus, we should have
ǫ′A ≥ J (B)vex (H(Y |X))− λ(σn, τn). (54)
Similarly, Theorem 5 implies that given the strategy σn for Alice, there exists a strategy
τ ∗n for Bob such that λ(σn, τ ∗n) ≤ J (A)cav (H(X|Y )). Hence,
λ(σn, τn)− λ(σn, τ ∗n) ≥ λ(σn, τn)− J (A)cav (H(X|Y )).
But (σn, τn) is a (ǫ′A, ǫ
′
B)-Nash equilibrium, thus, we should have
ǫ′B ≥ λ(σn, τn)−J (A)cav (H(X|Y )). (55)
On the other hand, since λ(σn, τn) is a convex combination of the entries of the payoff
table, we have m ≤ λ(σn, τn) ≤ m; this fact along with Equations (54) and (55) implies
that
max{m,J (B)vex (H(Y |X))− ǫ′A} ≤ λ(σn, τn) ≤ min{m,J (A)cav (H(X|Y )) + ǫ′B}.
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For v to be achievable, the above relation should be satisfied for λ(σn, τn), ǫ′A and ǫ
′
B
arbitrarily close to v, ǫA and ǫB, respectively. Thus, Equation (51) must hold.
Inequality (51) is sufficient: Let v, ǫA ≥ 0 and ǫB ≥ 0 be real numbers sat-
isfying (51). Equation (51) implies that m ≤ v ≤ m; hence, v can be expressed as
a convex combination of the entries of the payoff table; i.e., there exist action profiles
(a1, b1), (a2, b2), . . . , (ar, br) ∈ A × B, and non-negative numbers α1, α2, . . . , αr summing
to one such that
v =
r∑
i=1
αiuaibi .
Let us approximate each αi by a rational number ki/K such that
∑r
i=1 ki = K; for
arbitrary δ > 0, we can choose K large enough such that
|v − vˆ| ≤ δ, (56)
where vˆ =
∑r
i=1
ki
K
uaibi . We take K so large that not only inequality (56) is satisfied,
but also there exist strategies σ∗K and τ ∗K such that in the K-stage repeated game,
σ∗K secures expected average payoff of J (A)cav (H(X|Y )) − δ for Alice, and τ ∗K secures
J (B)vex (H(Y |X)) + δ for Bob (Such strategies σ∗K and τ ∗K exist since in long run, Alice
can secure J (A)cav (H(X|Y )), and Bob can secure J (B)vex (H(Y |X))).
Now, we are ready to construct the desired approximate Nash equilibrium (σn, τn).
Let the total stages of the game be of the form n = NK, and let us divide the total
n stages into N blocks of length K. The value of N will be set in the sequel. In each
block, Alice and Bob cycle through the action profiles (a1, b1), . . . , (ar, br) such that each
action profile (ai, bi) is repeated in ki stages. Note that the actions (a1, b1), . . . , (ar, br)
are deterministic, thus, each player can monitor the actions of the other player to see if
he/she is still following the rule or not. If Alice (resp. Bob) deviates the rule, then, in
the upcoming blocks, Bob (resp. Alice) plays according to the strategy τ ∗K (resp. σ∗K)
to secure payoff J (B)vex (H(Y |X)) + δ (resp. J (A)cav (H(X|Y ))− δ).
When Alice and Bob both play according to respective strategies σn and τn, the
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expected average payoff equals vˆ, i.e.,
λ(σn, τn) = vˆ. (57)
Next, we show that the strategy profile (σn, τn) forms the desired approximate Nash
equilibrium. Let Alice deviate from strategy σn, and play an arbitrary strategy σ′n.
Furthermore, let the deviation be detected by Bob at block j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. The
expected average payoff will be vˆ in the blocks before the j-th block, and the payoff of
the blocks after the j-th block (where Bob plays τ ∗K) will be at most J (B)vex (H(Y |X))+ δ.
In the j-th block, Alice could get at most M = max(a,b)∈A×B |uab|, thus,
λ(σ′n, τn) ≤ j − 1
N
vˆ +
M
N
+
N − j
N
(J (B)vex (H(Y |X)) + δ). (58)
Equation (58) along-with Equation (57) implies:
λn(σ
′n, τn)− λ(σn, τn) ≤ 1
N
(M− vˆ) + N − j
N
(J (B)vex (H(Y |X))− vˆ + δ)
≤ 2M
N
+
N − j
N
(J (B)vex (H(Y |X))− v + 2δ), (59)
where (59) follows from Equation (56), and the fact that vˆ ≥ −M. On the other hand,
Equation 51 implies:
J (B)vex (H(Y |X))− v ≤ ǫA. (60)
Equations (59) and (60) imply:
λn(σ
′n, τn)− λ(σn, τn) ≤ ǫA + 2M
N
+ 2δ. (61)
By a similar argument we can also show that for arbitrary strategy τ ′n for Bob we
have
λ(σn, τn)− λ(σn, τ ′n) ≤ ǫB + 2M
N
+ 2δ. (62)
Inequalities (61) and (62) imply that the strategy profile (σn, τn) forms a (ǫA + 2M/N +
2δ, ǫB + 2M/N + 2δ)-Nash equilibrium with expected average payoff vˆ. We can choose δ
small enough and N large enough to make 2M/N+2δ as small as desired, and hence, vˆ as
close to v as desired (according to (56)). Thus, v is an (ǫA, ǫB)-Nash equilibrium payoff.
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4.2. Approximate Nash equilibria achieved by autonomous strategies
We call a strategy an autonomous strategy if the action of each stage is indifferent
about the actions of the opponent in the previous stages. Formally, in the n stage repeated
game with leaked randomness sources defined in Section 3.1, strategies σn = (σ1, . . . , σn)
and τn = (τ1, . . . , τn) are autonomous if for arbitrary t ∈ {1, . . . , n} and arbitrary histories
at−1, a˜t−1 ∈ At−1, bt−1, b˜t−1 ∈ Bt−1, xt ∈ X t and yt ∈ Y t we have
σt(x
t, at−1, bt−1) = σt(x
t, at−1, b˜t−1), τt(y
t, at−1, bt−1) = τt(y
t, a˜t−1, bt−1).
Autonomous strategies are sufficient for construction of a Nash equilibrium for two-
player zero-sum repeated games, where players can freely randomize their actions. Fur-
thermore, in the repeated game with leaked randomness source, the maximum securable
payoff of Alice (the max-min payoff) can be secured by an autonomous strategy (see
(Valizadeh and Gohari, 2017, Section 3.3)). Therefore, we are also interested in the set
of approximate Nash equilibria achievable by the class of autonomous strategies.
In this section, we characterize the set of approximate Nash equilibria achievable by
autonomous strategies in a simplified version of the repeated game with leaked randomness
source. In the simplified version, we assume that the randomness sources Xn and Y n
are independent, i.e., pXY = pXpY , thus, we call it the repeated game with independent
randomness sources. It will turn out that the set of approximate Nash equilibria achievable
by autonomous strategies is strictly smaller than the set of all achievable approximate
Nash equilibria in Corollary 25. To proceed we need the following definition.
Definition 26. (ǫA, ǫB)-Nash equilibrium is achievable by autonomous strategies if for all
δ > 0 there exists a natural number n0 and a sequence of autonomous strategy profiles
{(σn, τn)}n∈N such that for all n ≥ n0, (σn, τn) forms a (ǫA + δ, ǫB + δ)-Nash equilibrium
in the n stage repeated game.
Theorem 27. In the repeated game with independent randomness sources, (ǫA, ǫB)-Nash
equilibrium is achievable by autonomous strategies if and only if there exist random vari-
ables A ∈ A, B ∈ B and Q ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} such that pABQ(a, b, q) = pQ(q)pA|Q(a|q)pB|Q(b|q)
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and
H(A|Q) ≤ H(X), H(B|Q) ≤ H(Y ),
gA(A,B|Q) ≤ ǫA, gB(A,B|Q) ≤ ǫB,
where gA(A,B|Q) and gB(A,B|Q) are defined as follows
gA(A,B|Q) =
3∑
q=0
pQ(q)
[
max
a∈A
E[uaB|Q = q]− E[uAB|Q = q]
]
,
gB(A,B|Q) =
3∑
q=0
pQ(q)
[
E[uAB|Q = q]−min
b∈B
E[uAb|Q = q]
]
.
Proof of Theorem 27 is provided in Appendix C.
Example 28. Consider a repeated game with independent randomness sources Xn and
Y n such that H(X) = 0, and H(Y ) = 1. The sets of actions of Alice and Bob are
A = B = {0, 1}, and the payoff table is as follows:
u00 = u11 = 1, u01 = u10 = −1.
Since H(X) = 0, Alice must play deterministic actions by which she can secure at most
−1; hence, J (A)cav (H(X|Y )) = −1. On the other hand, Bob has access to one bit ran-
domness per stage, thus, in each stage, he can play according to the max-min strategy of
the one shot game and secure 0, hence, J (B)vex (H(Y |X)) = 0. Consequently, Corollary 25
implies that (ǫA, ǫB)-Nash equilibrium is achievable if and only if ǫA + ǫB ≥ 1. Hence,
(1/2, 1/2)-Nash equilibrium is achievable. It is straightforward to check that ǫA = 1/2 and
ǫB = 1/2 does not satisfy the conditions of Theorem 27; therefore, in the repeated game
of this example, (1/2, 1/2)-Nash equilibrium is not achievable by autonomous strategies.
Remark 29. In the repeated game of Example 28, the set of approximate Nash equilibria
achievable by autonomous strategies is strictly smaller than the set of approximate Nash
equilibria achievable by arbitrary strategies. Therefore, for achieving approximate equilib-
ria of the repeated games with leaked randomness source, autonomous strategies are not
sufficient.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 14
For arbitrary α ∈ [1, 2] we have
∑
f∈F
pF (f)‖pf(X)Y − pApY ‖TV
=
1
2
∑
f∈F
(
pF (f)
∑
a∈A,y∈Y
∣∣∣∣Pr[f(X) = a, Y = y]− pA(a)PY (y)
∣∣∣∣
)
=
1
2
∑
y∈Y
(
pY (y)
∑
f∈F
(
pF (f)
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣
(∑
x∈X
pX|Y (x|y)1(f(x) = a)
)
− pA(a)
∣∣∣∣∣
))
(A.1)
=
1
2
∑
y∈Y

pY (y)∑
a∈A
∑
f∈F

pF (f) α
√√√√∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈X
pX|Y (x|y)
(
1(f(x) = a)− pA(a)
)∣∣∣∣∣
α




(A.2)
≤ 1
2
∑
y∈Y

pY (y)∑
a∈A
α
√√√√∑
f∈F
(
pF (f)
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈X
pX|Y (x|y)
(
1(f(x) = a)− pA(a)
)∣∣∣∣∣
α) ,
(A.3)
where 1(.) is the indicator function, and Equation (A.1) follows from
Pr[f(X) = a, Y = y] = pY (y)Pr[f(X) = a|Y = y] = pY (Y )
∑
x∈X
pX|Y (x|y)1(f(x) = a),
and reordering the summations. Equation (A.2) follows from 1/α
√
βα = β, and
∑
x∈X pX|Y (x|y) =
1. Inequality (A.3) is implied by utilizing the Jensen’s inequality for concave function α
√·.
Next, we claim that for arbitrary y ∈ Y and a ∈ A,
∑
f∈F
(
pF (f)
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈X
pX|Y (x|y)
(
1(f(x) = a)− pA(a)
)∣∣∣∣∣
α)
≤ 22−αpA(a)
∑
x∈X
pX|Y (x|y)α.
(A.4)
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Therefore, Equations (A.3) and (A.4) imply
∑
f∈F
pF (f)‖pf(X)Y − pApY ‖TV ≤ 1
2
∑
y∈Y

pY (y)∑
a∈A

2 2α−1pA(a) 1α
(∑
x∈X
pX|Y (x|y)α
) 1
α




= 22(
1
α
−1)
(∑
a∈A
pA(a)
1
α
)∑
y∈Y

pY (y)
(∑
x∈X
pX|Y (x|y)α
) 1
α


= 22(
1
α
−1)2
log
(∑
a∈A pA(a)
1
α
)
2
log
(∑
y∈Y
(
pY (y)(
∑
x∈X pX|Y (x|y)
α)
1
α
))
= 2
−(1− 1
α
)
(
Hα(X|Y )−H 1
α
(A)+2
)
.
The above equations fulfills the proof. Thus, we only need to prove the claim of
Equation (A.4). Instead of proving Equation (A.4), we prove Equation (A.5) which is
obtained by replacing pX|Y (x|y) with an arbitrary real function g : X → R:
∑
f∈F
(
pF (f)
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈X
g(x)
(
1(f(x) = a)− pA(a)
)∣∣∣∣∣
α)
≤ 22−αpA(a)
∑
x∈X
|g(x)|α. (A.5)
In order to interpret the above inequality, let us define σ-finite measure spaces (X ,ΣX , µX )
and (F ,ΣF , µF), where for all x ∈ X , µX (x) = 1, and for all f ∈ F , µF(f) = pF (f).
Furthermore, let T : GX → GF be a linear operator that maps GX (the set of real valued
functions on X ) to GF (the set of real valued functions on F) and is defined as below
(Tg)(f) =
∑
x∈X
g(x)
(
1(f(x) = a)− pA(a)
)
, ∀g ∈ GX and f ∈ F . (A.6)
Moreover, consider the following definition:
Definition 30. Let (Y ,ΣY , µY) and (Z,ΣZ , µZ) be σ-finite measure spaces, and h : Y →
R be a real function on the measure space (Y ,ΣY , µY). For arbitrary β1 > 0, the β1-norm
of h is denoted by ‖h‖Lβ1(µY ) and is defined as below:
‖h‖Lβ1(µY ) =
(∫
Y
|h(y)|β1dµY
) 1
β1
.
Lβ1(µY) denotes the set of real functions h : Y → R with bounded β1-norm, i.e., ‖h‖Lβ1(µY ) <
∞. For arbitrary β2 > 0, let M : Lβ1(µY) → Lβ2(µZ) be an operator that maps the real
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functions on the measure space (Y ,ΣY , µY) to the real functions on the measure space
(Z,ΣZ , µZ). ‖M‖Lβ1 (µY )→Lβ2 (µZ ) denotes the operator norm of M defined as follows:
‖M‖Lβ1 (µY )→Lβ2 (µZ ) = inf{c ≥ 0 : ‖Mh‖Lβ2 (µZ ) ≤ c‖h‖Lβ1 (µY ), ∀h ∈ Lβ1(µY)}.
Using the above definition and Equation (A.6), we can rewrite Equation (A.5) as
follows
‖T‖Lα(µX )→Lα(µF ) ≤ 2
2
α
−1pA(a)
1
α , (A.7)
In order to prove Equation (A.7), it suffices to prove it for the special cases α = 1
and α = 2, then, the general form with arbitrary α ∈ [1, 2] will be concluded from the
well-known Riesz-Thorin interpolation theorem.
Theorem 31 (Riesz-Thorin Interpolation Theorem). Let (Ω1,Σ1, µ1) and (Ω2,Σ2, µ2) be
arbitrary σ-finite measure spaces. Suppose 0 ≤ r0 ≤ r1 ≤ ∞, 0 ≤ s0 ≤ s1 ≤ ∞, and let
T be an arbitrary linear operator that maps Lr0(µ1) and L
r1(µ1) boundedly into L
s0(µ2)
and Ls1(µ2), respectively. For arbitrary 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, let 1/rθ = (1 − θ)/r0 + θ/r1 and
1/sθ = (1 − θ)/s0 + θ/s1, then, T maps Lrθ(µ1) boundedly into Lsθ(µ2) and satisfies the
operator norm estimate
‖T‖Lrθ (µ1)→Lsθ (µ2) ≤ ‖T‖1−θLr0(µ1)→Ls0 (µ2)‖T‖θLr1(µ1)→Ls1 (µ2).
We complete the proof by proving Equation (A.7), or equivalently Equation (A.5), for
α = 1 and α = 2. For α = 1, we have
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∑
f∈F
(
pF (f)
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈X
g(x)
(
1(f(x) = a)− pA(a)
)∣∣∣∣∣
)
≤
∑
f∈F
(
pF (f)
∑
x∈X
|g(x)|∣∣1(f(x) = a)− pA(a)∣∣
)
=
∑
x∈X
(
|g(x)|
∑
f∈F
pF (f)
∣∣
1(f(x) = a)− pA(a)
∣∣)
=
∑
x∈X
(
|g(x)|
(
pA(a)|1− pA(a)|+ (1− pA(a))|0− pA(a)|)
))
(A.8)
= 2pA(a)(1− pA(a))
(∑
x∈X
|g(x)|
)
≤ 2pA(a)
(∑
x∈X
|g(x)|
)
, (A.9)
where (A.8) follows from the property of the random mapping F that Pr[F (x) = a] =
pA(a). Therefore, Equation (A.5) holds for α = 1.
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For α = 2 we have
∑
f∈F

pF (f)
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈X
g(x)
(
1(f(x) = a)− pA(a)
)∣∣∣∣∣
2


=
∑
f∈F
(
pF (f)
∑
x,x′∈X
g(x)g(x′)
(
1(f(x) = a)− pA(a)
)(
1(f(x′) = a)− pA(a)
))
=
∑
f∈F
(
pF (f)
(∑
x∈X
g(x)2
(
1(f(x) = a)− pA(a)
)2
+
∑
x,x′∈X ,x 6=x′
g(x)g(x′)
(
1(f(x) = a)− pA(a)
)(
1(f(x′) = a)− pA(a)
)))
=
∑
x∈X
(
g(x)2
∑
f∈F
(
pF (f)
(
1(f(x) = a)− pA(a)
)2))
(A.10)
=
∑
x∈X
(
g(x)2
(
pA(a)(1− pA(a))2 + (1− pA(a))pA(a)2
))
(A.11)
= pA(a)(1− pA(a))
∑
x∈X
g(x)2
≤ pA(a)
∑
x∈X
g(x)2,
where (A.10) follows from the fact that for distinct x and x′, F (x) is independent of F (x′),
and
∑
f∈F PF (f)1(f(x) = a) = Pr[F (x) = a] = PA(a). Equation (A.11) is implied by
Pr[F (x) = a] = pA(a).
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 15
F is fully described by its elements {F (x)}x∈X , and hence, DTV is a deterministic
function of {F (x)}x∈X , i.e.,
DTV = g({F (x)}x∈X ),
where g : A|X | → R is a deterministic function defined as follows:
g({f(x)}x∈X ) = ‖pf(X)Y − pApY ‖TV .
Since DTV is a function of independent random variables, we utilize the McDiarmid’s
inequality (McDiarmid (1989)).
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Let f, f˜ ∈ F be two arbitrary mappings with equal assignments for all elements of X
except for some element x0, i.e.,
f(x) = f˜(x), ∀x ∈ X /{x0}, f(x0) 6= f˜(x0).
Then, we have:
g({f˜(x)}x∈X ) = 1
2
∑
y∈Y
(
p(y)
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈X
p(x|y)1[f˜(x) = a]− p(a)
∣∣∣∣∣
)
=
1
2
∑
y∈Y
(
p(y)
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈X
p(x|y)1[f(x) = a]− p(a) + p(x0|y)(1[f˜(x0) = a]− 1[f(x0) = a])
∣∣∣∣∣
)
≤ g({f(x)}x∈X ) + 1
2
∑
y∈Y
(
p(y)
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣p(x0|y)(1[f˜(x0) = a]− 1[f(x0) = a])∣∣∣
)
= g({f(x)}x∈X ) + p(x0).
Therefore, we have
|g({f˜(x)}x∈X )− g({f(x)}x∈X )| ≤ pX(x0).
Furthermore, recall that {F (x)}x∈X are independent random variables. Hence, McDi-
armid’s inequality (McDiarmid (1989)) implies:
Pr[|g({F (x)}x∈X )− E[g({F (x)}x∈X )]| ≥ t] ≤ 2e−
2t2∑
x∈X p(x)2 = 2e−2t
22H2(X).
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 27
In Appendix C.1 we show that provided the conditions of Theorem 27, (ǫA, ǫB)-
Nash equilibrium is achievable by autonomous strategies (achievability proof), and in
Appendix C.2, we show that if the autonomous strategy profile (σn, τn) forms an (ǫA, ǫB)-
Nash equilibrium, then, ǫA and ǫB satisfy the conditions of Theorem 27 (converse proof).
Appendix C.1. Achievability proof
Let A, B and Q be the random variables in the statement of Theorem 27 for which the
entropy constraints hold strictly, i.e., H(A|Q) < H(X), and H(B|Q) < H(Y ). Take n of
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the form n = NL, and divide the total n stages into L blocks of N stages. We generate
the action sequence of each block (except for the first block) as a function of the random
source observed during the previous block. In all stages of the first block, fixed actions
a ∈ A and b ∈ B are played by Alice and Bob, respectively. Furthermore, excluding the
first block, each block is further divided into four subblocks each of which include the
following set of stages:
I0 = {1, 2, . . . , ⌈pQ(0)N⌉},
I1 = {⌈pQ(0)N⌉ + 1, ⌈pQ(0)N⌉ + 2, . . . , ⌈pQ(0)N⌉ + ⌈pQ(1)N⌉},
I2 = {⌈pQ(0)N⌉ + ⌈pQ(1)N⌉+ 1, . . . , ⌈pQ(0)N⌉+ ⌈pQ(1)N⌉ + ⌈pQ(2)N⌉},
I3 = {⌈pQ(0)N⌉ + ⌈pQ(1)N⌉+ ⌈pQ(2)N⌉ + 1, . . . , N}. (C.1)
We generate strategies of Alice and Bob in such a way that they use the randomness
source observed in last block to generate the actions of current block. We would like the
generated actions of Alice and Bob to be almost i.i.d. according to respective distributions
pA|Q=q and pB|Q=q during each subblock Iq for all q ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Moreover, the action
played in each stage should be also independent of the other player’s observations up to
that stage. As H(A|Q) < H(X) and H(B|Q) < H(Y ), intuitively, each player could
generate his/her actions with the intended pmf as a function of his/her corresponding
randomness source observed during the previous block. Then, ǫ(A)(A,B|Q) ≤ ǫA and
ǫ(B)(A,B|Q) ≤ ǫB would imply that in limit, the constructed strategies form an (ǫA, ǫB)-
Nash equilibrium. We will now present the above sketch of proof more precisely.
For arbitrary i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}, let ANi = (Ai,1, . . . , Ai,N) and BNi = (Bi,1, . . . , Bi,N)
denote the actions of Alice and Bob, respectively, and let XNi = (Xi,1, . . . , Xi,N) and
Y Ni = (Yi,1, . . . , Yi,N) be the randomness sources observed by Alice and Bob, respectively,
during block number i. Let us construct the strategies σn for Alice and τn for Bob as
follows: Alice and Bob choose their actions in each block i ≥ 2 as a deterministic function
of the corresponding sequence of random sources observed during the previous block, i.e.,
block number i−1. Particularly, there exist a sequence of deterministic mappings {ϕi}Li=2
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and {ψi}Li=2 such that for all i ≥ 2 we have ANi = ϕi(XNi−1), and BNi = ψi(Y Ni−1). In all
stages of the first block, both Alice and Bob choose an arbitrary fixed action. Next, we
fulfill the specification of the strategies σn and τn by specifying the functions {ϕi}Li=2 and
{ψi}Li=2.
Let qAN and qBN be ideal distributions defined as follows:
qAN (a
N) =
3∏
q=0
∏
t∈Iq
pA|Q(at|q), qBN (bN ) =
3∏
q=0
∏
t∈Iq
pB|Q(bt|q). (C.2)
For arbitrary i ≥ 2, let ϕi be the mapping of Lemma 14 that simulates qAN from XNi−1,
and let ψi be the mapping of Lemma 14 that simulates qBN from Y
N
i−1. Thus, for all i ≥ 2
and 1 ≤ α ≤ 2, we have
∥∥∥pANi − qAN
∥∥∥
TV
≤ 2−(1−
1
α
)
(
Hα(XNi−1)−H 1
α
(q
AN
)+2
)
, (C.3)
∥∥∥pBNi − qBN
∥∥∥
TV
≤ 2−(1−
1
α
)
(
Hα(Y Ni−1)−H 1
α
(q
BN
)+2
)
. (C.4)
Note that Hα(X
N
i−1) = NHα(X), and
H 1
α
(qAN ) =
3∑
q=0
|Iq|H 1
α
(pA|Q=q) ≤ 4 log |A|+N
3∑
q=0
pQ(q)H 1
α
(pA|Q=q)
≤ N
(
2 +
3∑
q=0
pQ(q)H 1
α
(pA|Q=q)
)
,
where the first inequality follows from |Iq| ≤ pQ(q)N + 1 and H 1
α
(pA|Q=q) ≤ log |A|; the
second inequality holds for sufficiently large N . Therefore, Equation (C.3) implies
∥∥∥pANi − qAN
∥∥∥
TV
≤ 2−N(1−
1
α
)
(
Hα(X)−
∑3
q=0 pQ(q)H 1
α
(pA|Q=q)
)
. (C.5)
Note that limα→1
{
Hα(X)−
∑3
q=0 pQ(q)H 1α
(pA|Q=q)
}
= H(X)−H(A|Q) > 0; thus, there
exits a α > 1 such that Hα(X)−
∑3
q=0 pQ(q)H 1α
(pA|Q=q) > 0. Therefore, Equation (C.5)
implies that for arbitrary δ > 0, one can choose N large enough so that
∣∣∣∣∣∣pANi − qAN
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ δ. (C.6)
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A similar argument concludes that for sufficiently large N we have
∣∣∣∣∣∣pBNi − qBN
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ δ. (C.7)
Note that XNi−1 is independent of Y
N
i−1, thus, A
N
i is independent of B
N
i , i.e., pANi BNi =
pANi pBNi . This fact along with Equations (C.6), (C.7) and (C.2) implies∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣pANi BNi (aN , bN )−
3∏
q=0
∏
t∈Iq
pA|Q(at|q)pB|Q(bt|q)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ 2δ, (C.8)
where we utilized the third property of total variation in Lemma 1. Note that pANi BNi (a
N , bN )
is the actual distribution of actions in block number i, while
∏3
q=0
∏
t∈Iq
pA|Q(at|q)pB|Q(bt|q)
is the ideal one. Next, for arbitrary δ′ > 0, we have
λ(σn, τn) =
1
n
n∑
t=1
Eσn,τn[uAtBt ]
≥ 1
NL
(
−MN + (L− 1)
3∑
q=0
|Iq|E[uAB|Q = q]− 4(L− 1)NMδ
)
≥ E[uAB]− δ′ − 4Mδ, (C.9)
where the first inequality follows from the following two facts:
1. The expected payoff of the first block is bounded below by −MN , where M =
max(a,b)∈A×B |uab|.
2. Inequality C.8 implies that excluding the first block, the expected payoff of each
block is in at most 4MNδ distance of the expected payoff induced by the ideal
distribution of actions.
The second inequality holds for sufficiently large L and N , because (L− 1)|Iq|/NL tends
to pQ(q), and M/L tends to zero as N and L tend to infinity.
Next, we prove that the strategies σn and τn constructed above form the desired
approximate Nash equilibrium. Consider an arbitrary strategy σˆn (not necessarily an
autonomous strategy) for Alice, and let Alice and Bob play according to strategy profile
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(σˆn, τn). In this case, let AˆNi and Bˆ
N
i denote the sequence of actions of Alice and Bob in
block number i ≥ 1; moreover, let XˆNi and Yˆ Ni denote the sequence of randomness sources
observed during block number i ≥ 1. Observe that τn is an autonomous strategy, thus,
changing the strategy of Alice from σn to σˆn has not any impact on the actions of Bob;
hence, the sequence of actions of Bob (BˆNi ) still satisfies the property of Equation (C.7),
i.e., ∥∥∥∥∥∥pBˆNi (bN)−
3∏
q=0
∏
t∈Iq
pB|Q(bt|q)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ δ, ∀i = 2, . . . , L. (C.10)
Note that at t-th stage of block number i, Alice finds information about Yˆ Ni−1 just
through Bˆt−1i ; thus, Aˆi,t is independent of Yˆ
N
i−1 given Bˆ
t−1
i . On the other hand, (Bˆi,t, Bˆi,t+1, . . . , Bˆi,N)
is a deterministic function of Yˆ Ni−1. Therefore, Aˆi,t is also independent of (Bˆi,t, Bˆi,t+1, . . . , Bˆi,N)
given Bˆt−1i . Hence,
pAˆNi |BˆNi
(aN |bN ) =
N∏
t=1
pAˆi,t|Aˆt−1i Bˆt−1
(at|at−1, bt−1). (C.11)
Equations (C.10) and (C.11) along with the first property of total variation in Lemma 1
imply that for all i ≥ 2, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣pAˆNi BˆNi (aN , bN)−
3∏
q=0
∏
t∈Iq
pB|Q(bt|q)pAˆi,t|Aˆt−1i Bˆt−1i (at|a
t−1, bt−1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ δ. (C.12)
Note that the ideal distribution
∏3
q=0
∏
t∈Iq
pB|Q(bt|q)pAˆi,t|Aˆt−1i Bˆt−1i (at|a
t−1, bt−1) guaran-
tees that the expected payoff of block number i ≥ 2 is no more than
3∑
q=0
|Iq|max
a∈A
E[uaB|Q = q].
On the other hand, Equation (C.12) implies that the actual expected payoff of arbitrary
block number i ≥ 2 is in 2MNδ distance of the ideal one. Thus, the actual expected
payoff of block number i ≥ 2 is no more than
3∑
q=0
|Iq|max
a∈A
E[uaB|Q = q] + 2MNδ.
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Furthermore, the expected payoff of the first block is bounded above by NM; thus,
λ(σˆn, τn) =
1
n
n∑
t=1
Eσˆn,τn[uAˆtBˆt ]
≤ 1
NL
(
MN + (L− 1)
3∑
q=0
|Iq|max
a∈A
E[uaB|Q = q] + 2(L− 1)NMδ
)
≤ δ′ + 2Mδ +
3∑
q=0
pQ(q)
[
max
a∈A
E[uaB |Q]
]
, (C.13)
where the second inequality holds for sufficiently large L and N .
Equations C.9 and C.13 conclude
λ(σˆn, τn)− λ(σn, τn) ≤
3∑
q=0
pQ(q)
[
max
a∈A
E[uaB|Q]
]
− E[uAB] + 2δ′ + 6Mδ
= gA(A,B|Q) + 2δ′ + 6Mδ
≤ ǫA + 2δ′ + 6Mδ (C.14)
where the second inequality follows from the assumption in the statement of the theorem
that gA(A,B|Q) ≤ ǫA. By a similar argument as above, we can show that for arbitrary
strategy τˆn for Bob we have
λ(σn, τn)− λ(σn, τˆn) ≤ ǫB + 2δ′ + 6Mδ. (C.15)
Inequalities (C.14) and (C.15) imply that the strategy profile (σn, τn) forms a (ǫA+2δ
′+
6Mδ, ǫB + 2δ
′ + 6Mδ)-Nash equilibrium. But one can choose δ and δ′ small enough to
make 2δ′ + 6Mδ as small as desired; thus, (ǫA, ǫB)-Nash equilibrium is achievable.
Appendix C.2. Converse proof
Let (σn, τn) be an autonomous strategy profile generating an (ǫA, ǫB)-Nash equilibrium
in the n stage repeated game, and let An and Bn be the sequence of actions of Alice and
Bob. Let T be a random variable chosen from {1, 2, . . . , n} uniformly and independent of
(Xn, Y n, An, Bn). Let us define
A˜ = AT , B˜ = BT , Q = (T,A
T−1, BT−1).
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We show that the random variables Q, A˜, B˜ along with ǫA and ǫB satisfy the conditions
of Theorem 27.
The Markov conditions: In this part, our goal is to show that A˜ is independent of
B˜ given Q,i.e., pA˜B˜Q = pQpA˜|QpB˜|Q. To do this, it suffices to prove that for all t ≥ 1, At is
independent of Bt given (A
t−1, Bt−1). Note that the strategies σn and τn are autonomous,
hence, An is a deterministic function ofXn, and Bn is a deterministic function of Y n; thus,
the fact that Xn is independent of Y n implies that An is independent of Bn. Therefore,
At is independent of Bt given (A
t−1, Bt−1).
Entropy conditions: We show that H(A˜|Q) ≤ H(X):
H(A˜|Q) = H(AT |T,AT−1, BT−1)
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
H(At|At−1, Bt−1) (C.16)
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
H(At|At−1) (C.17)
=
1
n
H(An)
≤ 1
n
H(Xn) (C.18)
= H(X)
where (C.16) follows from the independence of T from (An, Bn). Recall that Xn is in-
dependent of Y n, thus, An –a deterministic function of Xn– is independent of Bn –a
deterministic function of Y n. Hence, Equation (C.17) is correct. Equation (C.18) is im-
plied by the fact that An is a deterministic function of Xn. A similar argument justifies
H(B˜|Q) ≤ H(Y ).
Equilibrium conditions: In this part we show that gA(A˜, B˜|Q) ≤ ǫA. To do this, we
consider a new game in which Alice and Bob play according to strategy profile (σˆn, τn),
where σˆn will now be constructed. In the new game, let Aˆn and Bˆn denote the respective
actions of Alice and Bob; furthermore, let Xˆn and Yˆ n denote the respective sources of
randomness of Alice and Bob, and Hˆt1 denote the history of observations of Alice until
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stage t. Note that τn is the same strategy as considered in the beginning of the converse
proof, whereas σˆn = (σˆ1, . . . , σˆn) is generated as follows: given hˆ
t
1, an arbitrary history of
observations of Alice until stage t, σˆt(hˆ
t
1) is the best choice of Alice that maximizes the
expected payoff at stage t, i.e.,
σˆt(hˆ
t
1) ∈ argmax
a∈A
Eτn
[
uaBˆt |Hˆt1 = hˆt1
]
,
where Eτn denotes the expectation with respect to the probability distribution induced
by τn and pY . We have
λ(σˆn, τn) =
n∑
t=1
∑
hˆt1
1
n
p
Hˆt1
(hˆt1)max
a∈A
Eτn [uaBˆt |Hˆt1 = hˆt1]
=
n∑
t=1
∑
xˆt,aˆt−1,bˆt−1
1
n
pXˆtAˆt−1Bˆt−1(xˆ
t, aˆt−1, bˆt−1)max
a∈A
Eτn [uaBˆt |xˆt, aˆt−1, bˆt−1]
=
n∑
t=1
∑
xˆt,aˆt−1,bˆt−1
1
n
pXˆtAˆt−1Bˆt−1(xˆ
t, aˆt−1, bˆt−1)max
a∈A
Eτn [uaBˆt |bˆt−1] (C.19)
=
n∑
t=1
∑
bˆt−1
1
n
pBˆt−1(bˆ
t−1)max
a∈A
Eτn [uaBˆt |bˆt−1]
=
n∑
t=1
∑
bt−1
1
n
pBt−1(b
t−1)max
a∈A
Eτn [uaBt |bt−1] (C.20)
=
n∑
t=1
∑
at−1,bt−1
1
n
pAt−1Bt−1(a
t−1, bt−1)max
a∈A
Eτn [uaBt |at−1, bt−1] (C.21)
=
∑
q
pQ(q)
[
max
a∈A
E[uaB˜|Q]
]
, (C.22)
where Equation (C.19) results from the following two facts:
1. Aˆt−1 is a deterministic function of (Xˆ t, Bˆt−1), thus, Bˆt is independent of Aˆ
t−1 given
(Xˆ t, Bˆt−1).
2. τn is an autonomous strategy, thus, Bˆt is a deterministic function of Yˆ t. On the
other hand, Yˆ t is independent of Xˆ t. Therefore, Bˆt is independent of Xˆ t.
Note again that τn is an autonomous strategy, thus, the probability distribution of the
actions of Bob is not related to the strategy of Alice; hence, pBˆn = pBn (recall that B
n is
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the sequence of actions of Bob in the original game in which strategy profile (σn, τn) is
played); as a result, Equation (C.20) holds. Since σn and τn are autonomous strategies,
An is a deterministic function of Xn, and Bn is a deterministic function of Y n. This fact
along with the independence of Xn from Y n implies that An is independent of Bn, thus
Equation (C.21) follows.
Furthermore, the expected average payoff induced by (σn, τn) equals
λ(σn, τn) =
n∑
t=1
1
n
Eτn [uAtBt ] = E[uA˜B˜] =
∑
q
pQ(q)E[uA˜B˜|Q]. (C.23)
Equations (C.22) and (C.23) imply
λ(σˆn, τn)− λ(σn, τn) =
∑
q
pQ(q)
[
max
a∈A
E[uaB|Q]− E[uA˜B˜|Q]
]
= gA(A,B|Q).
The above equation along with the fact that (σn, τn) is an (ǫA, ǫB)-Nash equilibrium
implies that gA(A,B|Q) ≤ ǫA. Using a similar argument as above, one can show that
gB(A,B|Q) ≤ ǫB.
Cardinality bound: The identified random variables (Q, A˜, B˜) satisfy the constraints
of the theorem, except the cardinality bound on Q. Cardinality of Q can be reduced using
standard arguments such as the support lemma of (El Gamal and Kim, 2011, Appendix
C), or the Fenchel-Bunt extension to the Caratheodory’s theorem. We modify pQA˜B˜ and
generate a new distribution p′
QA˜B˜
so that it also satisfies the cardinality bound. Let
p′
A˜B˜|Q
= pA˜B˜|Q; this guarantees that under p
′, given Q, A˜ is independent of B˜. Next,
we complete the definition of p′
QA˜B˜
by specifying the marginal distribution p′Q. We can
perceive p′Q as a real vector [p
′
Q(q), q ∈ Q] satisfying the following linear constraints:
p′Q(q) ≥ 0, q ∈ Q, (C.24)∑
q∈Q
p′Q(q) = 1, (C.25)
where Q is the sample space of the random variable Q.
Let H ′(A˜|Q) denote the entropy of A˜ given Q, under the distribution p′
A˜B˜Q
. Similarly,
the prime superscript in H ′(B˜|Q), g′A(A˜, B˜|Q) and g′B(A˜, B˜|Q) indicates that they are
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computed according to probability distribution p′
A˜B˜Q
. We drop the superscript when the
evaluation is done under the original probability distribution pA˜B˜Q. Assume that p
′
Q also
satisfies the following linear constraints:
H ′(A˜|Q) = H(A˜|Q), (C.26)
H ′(B˜|Q) = H(B˜|Q), (C.27)
g′A(A˜, B˜|Q) = gA(A˜, B˜|Q). (C.28)
Let P denote the polytope of marginal distributions p′Q satisfying (C.24)-(C.28). Note
that P is not empty since it contains pQ. We choose p
′
Q to be an element of P that
minimizes g′B(A˜, B˜|Q). This guarantees that p′A˜B˜Q inherits the following properties from
pA˜B˜Q:
H ′(A˜|Q) ≤ H(X), H ′(B˜|Q) ≤ H(Y ),
g′A(A˜, B˜|Q) ≤ ǫA, g′B(A˜, B˜|Q) ≤ ǫB.
We will now show that p′
A˜B˜Q
also satisfies the cardinality bound on the support of Q. Note
that g′B(A˜, B˜|Q) is linear in p′Q, hence, it’s minimum occurs in a vertex of the polytope P.
polytope P lies in a |Q| dimensional space, and hence, each of it’s vertices lies in at least
|Q| out of the |Q|+ 4 hyperplanes defining P (Equations (C.24)-(C.28)) . Therefore, p′Q,
which is a vertex of P, lies in at least |Q| − 4 out of |Q| hyperplanes of the form (C.24).
Hence, p′Q has at most 4 non-zero elements.
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